




The coronavirus dominated Indonesian politics in 2020. Rather than propel-
ling Indonesia in new directions, however, the pandemic amplified existing
political and societal dynamics.
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DOMESTIC POLITICS
The global pandemic that had the world in its grip after a coronavirus out-
break in China in December 2019 dominated Indonesian politics, economics,
and society throughout 2020. Its fallout will shape the country for years to
come. However, the year began with another kind of environmental disaster
that has by now become a routine occurrence: the flooding of Jakarta. This
time nearly 10% of the capital was inundated, killing 66 people and displacing
60,000. Government officials reacted to the recurring calamity with their
usual mix of cynicism and contempt for ordinary citizens. Jakarta’s regional
secretary Saefullah, the capital’s top civil servant, informed the public that
water was a feature of life—residents should therefore just “enjoy it” (Sari
2020). He died in September from coronavirus.
Despite the COVID-19 outbreak having occurred in China in December
2019 and the WHO declaring it a “public health emergency of international
concern” in January 2020, the government of Indonesia (GoI) reacted only
slowly to the threat. In early February, as the magnitude of the outbreak in
China became increasingly clear, the GoI suspended all flights to and from
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China. At the same time, the GoI denied for weeks that COVID-19 existed
anywhere in the archipelago.
Indonesia’s health minister, Terawan Putranto, a physician whose license
was almost revoked by the Indonesian Doctors Association’s Ethics Board in
2018 due to various dubious treatments he had exposed patients to, seemed
particularly inept at handling the pandemic. Appointed by President Joko
Widodo in October 2019 due to his popularity in military circles, he claimed
that prayer had prevented COVID-19 from spreading to Indonesia. Mean-
while, the secretary of the Health Ministry’s Directorate-General for Disease
Prevention and Control, Achmad Yurianto, told the media that COVID-19
and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2), for
which a tourist who had visited Bali had tested positive in February, were two
different viruses—hence, there were no COVID-19 cases in Indonesia (Pra-
bowo and Nugraheny 2020). In fact, SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that causes
COVID-19. In July Indonesia’s agriculture minister, Syahrul Yasin Limpo,
announced that his ministry would produce and distribute “anti-coronavirus
necklaces” consisting of a plastic pouch on a neck lanyard with a eucalyptus
sprig inside. The proposal was ridiculed across the world, but Putranto
defended it, saying that the necklace would boost Indonesians’ immune
system by increasing their confidence (Guardian 2020).
In reaction to these blunders, numerous civil society organizations and
state agencies criticized the Ministry of Health’s handling of the pandemic.
The Indonesian Doctors Association (Ikatan Dokter Indonesia) and the
Association of Public Health Professionals (Ikatan Ahli Kesehatan Masyar-
akat Indonesia) blamed the Ministry of Health for a lack of testing capabil-
ities and inadequate supplies of medical equipment. The Ombudsman’s
Office called the government’s information strategy regarding the pandemic
“terrible” (sangat buruk) (Tempo 2020). Even the president’s chief of staff,
Moeldoko, stated publicly that the GoI could not rely on the Health Ministry
in its efforts to overcome the pandemic.
The country reported its first official COVID-19 cases in early March.
Subsequently, President Widodo established a National COVID-19 Task
Force under the guidance of Doni Monardo, chair of the Indonesian
National Board for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan
Bencana). In late March, the president declared a public health disaster
emergency and imposed large-scale social restrictions (pembatasan sosial bers-
kala besar). However, the GoI refrained from implementing the harsh
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lockdown measures seen in many other countries, partly because declaring
a quarantine would have obliged officials to provide sustenance to people
affected by it. The large-scale restrictions were imposed again in September
after a spike in COVID-19 infections.
The full impact of the pandemic on Indonesian society, politics, and
economics was not clear by year’s end. The death toll was steadily mounting
throughout 2020, a fact the GoI tried repeatedly to downplay. By year’s end,
there were over 20,000 confirmed COVID-19 deaths, although a Reuters
(2020) report suggested that the actual number was much higher. At least 115
doctors and 88 nurses had died from COVID-19 by September, placing
Indonesia among the five countries with the highest casualty rates among
medical personnel worldwide (Jakarta Globe, September 14).
Authoritarianism and Corruption
The rollback of Indonesia’s democratic achievements of the past 20 years
continued throughout 2020. Mechanisms to improve accountability and
transparency were especially unpopular among Indonesia’s political establish-
ment. For example, Interior Minister Tito Karnavian launched yet another
attack on direct elections for subnational offices. For several years, he has tried
to abolish direct elections for district heads and mayors. This time, he sug-
gested disenfranchising voters in regions with high poverty and low educa-
tional attainment (Alam 2020).
In April, Rahmat Mahulette and Ronny Bugis, two policemen, were
charged with assault for an acid attack against Novel Baswedan in April
2017. The attack left Baswedan, a senior investigator with the Corruption
Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) and
a cousin of Anies Baswedan, the governor of Jakarta, partially blind. He has
repeatedly denounced the arrest and trial of the two low-ranking police
officers and called for their acquittal. He considers the trial a sham intended
to protect higher-level personnel in the security apparatus. He pointed to
Police Inspector-General Rudy Heriyanto as having undermined a thorough
investigation of the case. In July, judges finally sentenced Mahulette and
Bugis to 24 and 18 months in prison, respectively, arguing that they had
acted purely out of personal anger at the KPK.
Amnesty International called the verdict “theater” (Arsyad 2020), and the
Public Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Masyarakat Indonesia)
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said that the two convicts were mere scapegoats for the real perpetrators
(Tribun, July 18, 2020). The lack of respect for human rights under the
second Widodo administration was also shown in October, when the pres-
ident appointed Brigadier Generals Dadang Hendrayudha and Yulius Selva-
nus to important posts in the Ministry of Defense. Both generals had been
members of the Special Forces Rose Team, which abducted pro-democracy
activists between 1997 and 1998. Indonesia’s current defense minister, Pra-
bowo Subianto, headed the Special Forces at the time.
Government harassment of the media also continued. In January, the
arrest of Philip Jacobsen, a foreign journalist who had attended a meeting
of the provincial parliament in Central Kalimantan, sparked a debate over the
decline of press freedom in Indonesia. Initially arrested and charged with
a visa violation, Jacobsen was held under house arrest in the provincial capital
of Palangkaraya and then deported. Observers saw Jacobsen’s treatment as
part of a growing trend of xenophobia in Indonesian government circles
directed at Westerners (Cochrane 2020).
Indonesia’s judiciary continued to be marred by corruption and nepotism. At
the beginning of the year, the president appointed Daniel Yusmic as the ninth
member of the Constitutional Court. An undistinguished academic, Yusmic’s
appointment suggested that personal loyalty rather than professional credentials
continues to shape many of Widodo’s personnel decisions. In April, Muham-
mad Syarifuddin became the 14th Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of In-
donesia. He will serve until October 2024. Only a few weeks later, the KPK
arrested Nurhadi Abdurrachman, the former Supreme Court secretary, for
allegedly accepting nine checks and IDR 46 billion (US$ 3.2 million) in cash
related to several court cases between 2011 and 2016. The arrest reminded In-
donesians that corruption has undermined the Supreme Court for years.
In July, news broke that Djoko Tjandra, a high-profile corruptor related to
the Bank Bali Scandal of 1999 whom law enforcement had tried to apprehend
since his conviction in 2009, had entered Indonesia that month, obtained an
electronic identity card, filed a judicial review of his case with the South
Jakarta District Court, and disappeared again without ever drawing the
attention of law enforcement. Indonesia’s police chief later fired a one-star
military general, Prasetijo Utom, for having signed a transit permit for Djoko
Tjandra after flying with him to Indonesia on a private jet chartered from
Transwisata Prima Aviation, which is owned by Tomy Winata, a business-
man with alleged links to organized crime. In August the police revealed that
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a prosecutor from the Attorney General’s Office, Pinangki Sirna Malasari,
had met with Tjandra in Malaysia. She had allegedly received US$ 500,000
from Tjandra. Later in July, Tjandra was arrested in Malaysia and extradited
to Indonesia. The controversy surrounding the arrest of Djoko Tjandra
showed that corruption remains endemic in law enforcement and the judi-
ciary in Indonesia.
In November, the KPK arrested Edhy Prabowo, minister of maritime
affairs and fisheries. In May, he had lifted a ban on the exports of lobster
larvae imposed by his predecessor. The ministry under Prabowo’s control
subsequently issued the highly lucrative export licenses mainly to members of
the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), in which Edhy Prabowo is
a senior figure close to party chairman (and defense minister) Prabowo Sub-
ianto (Gokkon 2020).
In December, the KPK arrested Juliari Peter Batubara, the minister for
social affairs, for allegedly having received kickbacks from companies that
were providing food parcels to Indonesians as part of a COVID-19 aid
program. The KPK subsequently found over IDR 14.5 billion (US$ 1.2
million) in cash stuffed into seven suitcases and three backpacks at the
defendant’s private residence (BBC 2020).
ECONOMY
Fiscal conditions were already weak, and investment remained sluggish at the
beginning of 2020. The economic fallout of the COVID-19 crisis aggravated
Indonesia’s poor economic outlook. Midyear, as the economic impact of the
pandemic became increasingly clear, Widodo issued Decree-in-Lieu-of-Law
No. 1/2020. The decree lifted a fiscal rule adopted in 2003 that capped annual
deficits at 3% of GDP and raised it to 5%; it also authorized IDR 405 trillion
(US$ 28 billion) in spending.
The GoI subsequently established various support and stimulus programs.
IDR 123 trillion (US$ 9 billion) was earmarked for medium-sized, small, and
micro-enterprises. In August, Widodo also announced IDR 22 trillion (US$
1.5 billion) in cash grants to nine million micro-enterprises. The same month,
Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati inaugurated a program called Sub-
sidized Wage Recipient Assistance, through which direct cash assistance
would be transferred to every active worker earning less than IDR 5 million
(US$ 350) per month until year’s end.
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While Indonesian citizens very much welcomed such measures to mitigate
the economic impact of COVID-19, the GoI disbursed many of these funds
only slowly or not at all. The president also issued Presidential Regulation
No. 64/2020, raising premiums for the State Health Insurance Agency (Ba-
dan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial Kesehatan)—a move that was criticized as
insensitive to the plight of those Indonesians whose health was affected by the
pandemic.
In February, Widodo submitted the Omnibus Bill on Job Creation to
the national parliament. The bill aimed to revise sections of 79 existing
laws. Parliament and trade union representatives reached an agreement in
August, and in October the national parliament passed the bill. It
amended 76 existing laws, with changes to provisions ranging from
employment, research and innovation, and land procurement to the ease
of doing business. Within days, protests erupted across the archipelago.
Labour unions criticized the law for weakening workers’ rights, while
environmental groups said it would weaken environmental protection.
Unfazed, on November 2 President Widodo signed the bill, and it became
Law No. 11/2020.
In July, Presidential Chief of Staff Moeldoko announced that the Peatland
Restoration Agency (Badan Restorasi Gambut) would be terminated in
December 2020. The agency plays a crucial role in protecting Indonesia’s
peatland forests, whose exploitation has been responsible for various envi-
ronmental disasters over the years, including a haze that annually pollutes the
air over large parts of Southeast Asia. Environmental groups were quick to
point out that the announcement of its abolishment was made in the same
week as Widodo tasked Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto with creating
a 148,000-hectare food-crop estate in Central Kalimantan Province, which
will require the clearing of peatland.
The Ombudsman’s Office reported in August that Indonesia’s minister of
state-owned enterprises, Erick Thohir, had violated the law by appointing
high-ranking bureaucrats as commissioners of state-owned enterprises. This
practice, which allows regulators to work in the companies they regulate, was
outlawed by Law 25/2009 on Public Services (Buehler 2011). But the Yud-
hoyono and the Jokowi administrations have both ignored the prohibition.
In other words, the Widodo administration continued to allow collusive
practices at the highest level of the state apparatus, even though they are in
direct violation of the law.
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SOCIETAL ISSUES
The culture wars between secular-nationalist and Islamist groups, which have
been underway for several years, continued throughout 2020. In June, the
GoI postponed discussions of a Bill on the Ideological Guidelines of Pancasila
(Haluan Ideologi Pancasila). The increasingly brazen behavior of Islamic
hard-line groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (Forum Pembela Islam)
triggered a debate in 2018 on how to strengthen Pancasila, the ecumenical
state ideology. Widodo then tasked former President Megawati Sukarnoputri
with the drafting of a bill that would bolster Pancasila. After Islamic groups
voiced their opposition to the proposal—they warned that it would facilitate
the resurgence of communism and Marxism—the discussion of the role and
function of Pancasila in Indonesian politics and society was postponed.
In June, the United Development Party, the National Mandate Party, and
the Prosperous Justice Party introduced an anti-alcohol bill into the legisla-
tive agenda. The Islamic parties claimed that prohibiting alcohol would
reduce deaths from alcohol poisoning.
In December, Habib Rizieq, a radical Islamic preacher and leader of the
Islamic Defenders Front (Forum Pembela Islam), one of the country’s largest
vigilante movements, returned to Indonesia after three years in self-imposed
exile in Saudi Arabia. Rizieq had left Indonesia after law enforcement accused
him of exchanging pornographic messages and nude photos with a woman in
2017. After his return, Rizieq called for a “moral revolution” in front of
thousands of supporters at Sukarno-Hatta International Airport.
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In September, Widodo delivered his first speech to the General Assembly of
the United Nations. The speech emphasized Indonesia’s history of nonalign-
ment. It was prerecorded and delivered online to comply with COVID-19
health protocols. In October the new prime minister of Japan, Suga Yoshi-
hide, visited Indonesia to discuss cooperation between the two countries in
the South China Sea. A week later, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met
with President Widodo to emphasize the importance of protecting access to
the South China Sea in light of China’s growing authority in the area. China
released a statement criticizing Pompeo’s comments. Tensions with China in
the Natuna Sea continued throughout 2020 as Chinese Coast Guard vessels
patrolled territory the Indonesian government claims authority over.
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CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 crisis dominated Indonesian politics and society in 2020.
Rather than being a transformative force, however, the pandemic amplified
the status quo. The long-term implications of the pandemic for Indonesia’s
political and economic trajectory were far from clear at the end of the year.
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